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Abstract. We propose an architecture that preserves user privacy in the
semantic Web via tag suppression. In tag suppression, users may wish
to tag some resources and refrain from tagging some others in order to
hinder privacy attackers in their eﬀorts to proﬁle users’ interests. Follow-
ing this strategy, our architecture helps users decide which tags should
be suppressed. We describe the implementation details of the proposed
architecture and provide further insight into the modeling of proﬁles. In
addition, we present a mathematical formulation of the optimal trade-
oﬀ between privacy and tag suppression rate.
1 Introduction
The World Wide Web constitutes the largest repository of information in the
world. Since its invention in the nineties, the form in which information is or-
ganized has evolved substantially. At the beginning, web content was classiﬁed
in directories belonging to diﬀerent areas of interest, manually maintained by
experts. These directories provided users with accurate information, but as the
Web grew they rapidly became unmanageable. Although they are still available,
they have been progressively dominated by the current search engines based on
web crawlers, which explore new or updated content in a methodic, automatic
manner. However, even though search engines are able to index a large amount
of web content, they may provide irrelevant results or fail when terms are not ex-
plicitly included in web pages. A query containing the keyword accommodation,
for instance, would not retrieve web pages with terms such as hotel or apartment
not including that keyword.
Recently, a new form of conceiving the Web, called the semantic Web [1], has
emerged to address this problem. The semantic Web, envisioned by Tim Berners-
Lee in 2001, is expected to provide the web content with a conceptual structure so
that information can be interpreted by machines. The semantic Web requires to
explicitly associate meaning with resources on the Web. This process is normally
referred to as semantic tagging, or simply tagging, and is supposed to play a key
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role for the semantic Web to become a reality. One of the beneﬁts of associating
concepts with web pages is the semantic interoperability in web applications.
Furthermore, tagging allows applications to decrease the interaction with users,
to obtain some form of semantic distance between web pages and to ultimately
process web pages whose content is nowadays only understandable by humans.
Despite the many advantages the semantic Web is bringing to the Web com-
munity, the continuous tagging activity prompts serious privacy concerns. More
speciﬁcally, tags submitted to a web server could be used to derive user’s prefer-
ences [2] or expertise [3], and thus obtain precise user proﬁles containing sensitive
information such as health, political aﬃliation, salary or religion. This could be
the case of recommendation web sites such as Last.fm, Movielens or Jinni, where
user proﬁles are normally shown by some kind of histogram or tag cloud, as de-
picted in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. A histogram (a) and a tag cloud (b) displaying user proﬁles in Movielens
and Jinni, respectively
1.1 Contribution and Plan of This Paper
In this paper, we present an architecture that preserves user privacy in the se-
mantic Web via tag suppression. More speciﬁcally, users may wish to tag some
resources and refrain from tagging some others when their privacy is being com-
promised. The proposed architecture helps users decide which tags should be
suppressed in order to hinder privacy attackers in their eﬀorts to proﬁle users’ in-
terests. Consequently, this approach guarantees user privacy to a certain extent,
at the cost of processing overhead and the semantic loss incurred by suppressing
tags, but without having to trust the web server or the network operator.
Additionally, we present an information-theoretic formulation of the trade-oﬀ
between privacy and tag suppression rate, which arises from our deﬁnition of
privacy risk. In particular, we measure privacy risk as a divergence between a
user’s apparent tag distribution and the population’s.
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Sec. 2 explores the basics of the semantic Web and reviews some relevant
approaches related to privacy. Sec. 3 describes our privacy-preserving architec-
ture and focuses on its internal components. Sec. 4 presents our privacy measure
and a formulation of the trade-oﬀ between privacy and tag suppression rate.
Conclusions are drawn in Sec. 5.
2 State of the Art
This section describes the fundamentals of the semantic Web and includes some
relevant contributions to privacy within this context.
As mentioned in Sec. 1, the semantic Web requires to explicitly associate
meaning with resources on the Web. In order to achieve this meaningful struc-
ture, the conceptual description of resources must be described formally. For this
purpose, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) proposes to use the resource
description format (RDF), which is a general-purpose language for representing
information on the Web. In RDF, the meaning is encoded by a triple consist-
ing of a subject, a predicate and an object. According to this format, a resource
on a web page (subject) is associated with a property (predicate), to which a
value (object) is assigned. For instance, in the statement “1984 was written by
George Orwell”, “1984” would be the subject, “was written by” the predicate,
and “George Orwell” the object.
Although RDF provides the technology to describe meaning, the semantic
Web requires also that concepts and terms share a common deﬁnition. Ontolo-
gies, which are deﬁned in [4] as “a formal, explicit speciﬁcation of a shared
conceptualization”, arise with this aim. In the semantic web context, an ontol-
ogy is a set of statements where terminology is deﬁned using a speciﬁc language.
Several languages such as RDF schemas (RDF-S) [5] or ontology web language
(OWL) [6] are used to express ontologies.
A number of approaches have been suggested to preserve user privacy in
the semantic Web, most of them focused on privacy policies. In the traditional
Web, the majority of web sites interact with users to provide them with privacy
policies, and allowing them to ﬁnd out how their private information will be
managed. Unfortunately, users do not frequently understand [7] or even read [8]
privacy policies. The platform for privacy preferences (P3P) is created to deal
with this situation and provides a framework with informed online interactions.
More speciﬁcally, when a web site supports the P3P, it establishes a set of poli-
cies to deﬁne how user’s private information will be used. Users, in turn, set their
own privacy policies to determine what kind of personal information they are
willing to disclose to the web sites they browse. Accordingly, when a user browses
a web site, P3P compares both the web site’s and the user’s privacy policies. If
they do not match, P3P informs the user about this situation and consequently
they decide how to proceed. In the semantic Web, this process is intended to
be carried out by autonomous agents. In this context, several policy languages
to deﬁne privacy and security requirements have been proposed. In [9], the au-
thors suggest a new semantic policy language based on RDF-S to express access
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control requirements over concepts deﬁned in ontologies. In [10], privacy and au-
thentication policies are incorporated into the descriptions of an ontology called
OWL for services (OWL-S). Furthermore, the authors implement algorithms for
the requester to verify the provider’s adherence to policies.
In the context of private information retrieval (PIR), users send general-pur-
pose queries to an information service provider. An example would be a user
sending the query:“What was George Orwell’s real name?”. In this scenario,
query forgery, which consists in accompanying genuine with false queries, ap-
pears as an approach to guarantee user privacy to a certain extent at the cost of
traﬃc and processing overhead. Building on this principle, several PIR protocols,
mainly heuristic, have been proposed and implemented. In [11,12], a solution is
presented, aimed to preserve the privacy of a group of users sharing an access
point to the Web while surﬁng the Internet. The authors propose the generation
of fake transactions, i.e., accesses to a web page to hinder eavesdroppers in their
eﬀorts to proﬁle the group. Privacy is measured as the similarity between the
actual proﬁle of a group of users and that observed by privacy attackers [11]. Spe-
ciﬁcally, the authors use the cosine measure, as frequently used in information
retrieval [13], to capture the similarity between the group genuine proﬁle and the
group apparent proﬁle. Based on this model, some experiments are conducted
to study the impact of the construction of user proﬁles on the performance [14].
In line with this, some simple, heuristic implementations in the form of add-ons
for popular browsers have recently started to appear [15, 16].
Despite the simplicity of the mechanism described above, an analogous tag
forgery would clearly not be convenient for the semantic Web, which is the
motivating application of our work. Submitting a tag implies the construction of
conceptual relations, a much more complex process than just sending a simple
query to a service provider. Therefore, users might not be willing to manually
tag web content they are not interested in.
3 An Architecture for Privacy Preservation in the
Semantic Web
This section presents the main contribution of this work: a privacy-preserving
architecture in the semantic Web via tag suppression. More speciﬁcally, Sec. 3.1
provides further insight into the construction of user proﬁles. Sec. 3.2 exam-
ines our architecture from a global point of view. Sec. 3.3 focuses on the user-
side architecture and goes into the details of its internal functional blocks. The
speciﬁcation of one of these blocks will be given in Sec. 4.
3.1 User Profile Construction
Our architecture contemplates that the proﬁle of a user is directly obtained from
speciﬁc modules integrated into the user’s system. Before giving any details on
the construction of user proﬁles, we will ﬁrst explore how this information could
be represented.
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Sec. 1 already mentioned that some recommendation web sites commonly use
some kind of histogram to show a user proﬁle, as in the case of Movielens, or
tag clouds, as in Jinni. Bearing in mind these examples, we propose a ﬁrst-
approximation, mathematically-tractable model of user proﬁle as a probability
mass function (PMF). Accordingly, we suggest two alternatives to model a user
proﬁle. Our ﬁrst proposal entails certain information loss, as it uses categories
into which tags are mapped. On the one hand, this could be diﬃcult to carry
out, as the meaning of tags would have to be interpreted in order to classify
them into categories, but on the other hand, the description of user proﬁles
could be simpliﬁed. Our second alternative represents a user proﬁle by means
of tags, which do not necessarily coincide with the semantic tags in the RDF
format discussed in Sec. 2. Consequently, this approach could provide a much
more accurate description of user proﬁles, although at the expense of a higher
complexity.
Once we have described our proposals to represent a user proﬁle, we will
now focus on how to extract this information from a user tag activity. We shall
assume that user proﬁles are modeled by tags, although all considerations also
apply to category-based proﬁles. The naive solution is to locally keep a histogram
of all the submitted tags, and to calculate the relative frequency of each tag.
Accordingly, this PMF would be updated every time a new tag is generated.
However, an improved version would explore contextual information to derive
a more accurate proﬁle. A possible approach would be using the vector space
model [17], as normally done in information retrieval, to represent web pages
as tuples containing their most representative terms. More speciﬁcally, the term
frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) would be applied to calculate
the weights of each term appearing in a web page. Afterwards, the most weighted
terms could be combined with the semantic tag submitted by the user in order
to obtain an enriched tag. In the remainder of this section, we shall refer to this
enriched tag as profile tag, as it will be used by the system to construct the user
proﬁle, whereas we shall call semantic tag, or simply tag, the one created by the
user in a format such as RDF. For instance, consider a user browsing a web page
and submitting the tag “A conference was held in Copenhagen”. Instead of using
this tag to update the user proﬁle, the system would ﬁrst extract contextual
information from the web page as described above, and later, the proﬁle tag
“Copenhagen climate conference” would be used to update the user proﬁle,
resulting in a more precise description.
Although this section just describes how to construct user proﬁles, analogous
arguments would apply to the modeling of the population proﬁle. Sec. 3.3 gives
more details on this.
3.2 Architecture Overview
Our architecture is built on the simple principle of tag suppression. More spe-
ciﬁcally, a user may wish to tag some resources and refrain from tagging some
others when their privacy is being compromised. Our proposal is motivated by
the intuitive observation that a privacy attacker will have actually gained some
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information about a user whenever the user proﬁle diﬀers from the population
proﬁle. Accordingly, we now describe an architecture that helps users decide
which tags should be suppressed in order to hinder privacy attackers in their
eﬀorts to construct a user proﬁle too diﬀerent from the population proﬁle.
The main component of this architecture is the web and tag server (WTS), a
single entity in which web pages and their semantic tags are stored. Users brows-
ing the Web would retrieve those data from the WTSs. The web browser would
represent this information so that it could be understood by users. Afterwards,
users would generate their own semantic tags and would submit them to the
WTSs.
Users would calculate the population proﬁle as the relative frequency of the
tags stored in a particular WTS. This could be done by a crawler application
collecting the tags submitted to that WTS. Later, this proﬁle would be used
to prevent that WTS from deriving accurate user proﬁles. As the population
would be restricted to users tagging in the same WTS, they would have to store
a diﬀerent population proﬁle for each WTS. More details are given in the next
section.
3.3 User-Side Architecture
This section examines the internal components of the proposed architecture and
goes into the details of a practical implementation.
The user-side architecture is depicted in Fig. 2. As it can be seen there, our
proposal is composed by a number of modules, each of them performing a speciﬁc
task. Next, we provide a functional description of all of their components.
Web Browser. This module is essentially responsible for the communication
with the WTS. Speciﬁcally, it downloads both the web content and the semantic
tags that the user speciﬁes by means of a URL. Afterwards, the web content
is delivered to the context analyzer, which extracts contextual information from
the web page. The web browser is also in charge of submitting the tags proposed
by the user to the WTS. Last but not least, this module also retrieves the tags
requested by the tag crawler component.
Context Analyzer. This module is aimed to process the web content that
is either requested by the user or explored by the tag crawler. Particularly, it
performs this task by using the vector space model and the TF-IDF weights
commented on in Sec. 3.1. As a result, a tuple of weighted terms is internally
generated for each web page. Later, the context analyzer takes a number of the
most weighted terms of each tuple, and sends them to the profile tag generator
module. The selection of these terms could be done according to these two pos-
sible alternatives: a user could choose either a ﬁxed number of terms n, or those
terms with weights above a threshold t. This selection poses an inherent compro-
mise between accuracy and complexity, regardless the alternative chosen. The
higher the resulting number of terms, the higher the accuracy in the description
of the proﬁle tag, but the higher the diﬃculty to handle that user proﬁle.
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Tag Crawler. This module retrieves the tags stored in a WTS. Namely, the web
browser gives the tag crawler the URL speciﬁed by the user. The tag crawler
browses then the web pages stored in the corresponding WTS and retrieves the
other users’ tags. These retrieved tags are submitted to the proﬁle tag generator
module linked to the population profile constructor block.
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Fig. 2. Internal components of the user-side architecture
Profile Tag Generator. This component generates proﬁle tags from both the
semantic tags and the contextual information given by the context analyzer.
The architecture is composed of two proﬁle tag generator modules. One of these
modules derives proﬁle tags from the tags proposed by the user, and the other
generates them from the population’s tags retrieved by the tag crawler. The
resulting proﬁle tags are delivered respectively to the modules user profile con-
structor and population proﬁle constructor. In addition, the user’s proﬁle tags
are sent to the privacy risk alarm generator block.
Population Profile Constructor. It is responsible for the estimation of the
population’s tag proﬁle. As the concept of population is limited to users tagging
in a common WTS, this module requires to store a population proﬁle for each
WTS. Speciﬁcally, this module obtains proﬁle tags from one of the proﬁle tag
generators. Based on these proﬁle tags, the population proﬁle constructor pro-
ceeds as follows: if the proﬁle tag is not included in the population proﬁle, a new
entry for it will be automatically created. However, if the proﬁle tag already
exists the population proﬁle will be just updated. Alternatively, this block could
query databases containing this kind of information. This would be the case, for
example, of a future application similar to Google Insight.
A Privacy-Preserving Architecture for the Semantic Web 65
User Profile Constructor. Analogously to the population proﬁle constructor,
this component generates the user’s tag proﬁle. Speciﬁcally, this module receives
proﬁle tags from the proﬁle tag generator dealing with the tags proposed by
the user. These proﬁle tags update the user proﬁle like the population proﬁle
constructor module does.
Suppressing Tag Generator. This module is the core of the proposed archi-
tecture as it is directly responsible for the user privacy. First, this component
is provided with both the user and the population proﬁle. In addition, the user
speciﬁes a tag suppression rate σ, which is a parameter reﬂecting the propor-
tion of tags that the user is willing to suppress. Next, this module computes
the optimum tuple of suppressing tags r∗, which contains information about the
proﬁle tags that should be suppressed. Finally, this tuple is given to the privacy
risk alarm generator module. The suppressing tag generator block is speciﬁed in
Sec. 4 by means of a mathematical formulation of the trade-oﬀ between privacy
and tag suppression rate.
Privacy Risk Alarm Generator. The functionality of this module is to warn
the user when their privacy is being compromised. When the user submits a tag
to the system, this module waits for the proﬁle tag generator to send the proﬁle
tag corresponding to the semantic tag. Additionally, this module receives the
tuple r∗ and proceeds as follows: if the probability of that proﬁle tag in r∗ is
positive, a privacy risk alarm is generated to warn the user, and it is then for the
user to decide whether to eliminate the tag or not. However, if that probability
is zero, the system is not aware of any privacy risk and then sends the tag to
the web browser.
Having examined each individual component, we will next describe how this
system would work. Initially, the user would browse a web page and would submit
tags to a WTS. The contextual information derived by the context analyzer
would be used to transform these tags into proﬁle tags, and then construct the
user proﬁle. At the same time, the tag crawler would retrieve semantic tags from
that WTS, and analogously the population proﬁle would be constructed. Both
the user proﬁle and the population proﬁle would be used to calculate the tuple r∗
every time these proﬁles were updated. At a certain point, the user could receive
a privacy risk alarm when trying to submit a new tag. If this was the case, the
user would have to decide whether to eliminate the tag or not.
4 Formulation of the Trade-Oﬀ between Privacy and Tag
Suppression Rate
This section presents our privacy criterion and a formulation of the trade-oﬀ
between privacy and tag suppression rate in the semantic Web, which is used to
specify one of the functional blocks in Sec. 3.3.
Sec. 3.1 explained how certain recommendation web sites show user proﬁles.
In particular, we mentioned that this information is normally displayed using
histograms or tag clouds. Now, we provide a more formal approach to describe
66 J. Parra-Arnau, D. Rebollo-Monedero, and J. Forne´
user proﬁles. Speciﬁcally, we model user tags as random variables (r.v.’s) on a
common ﬁnite alphabet of n categories or topics, or more speciﬁc tags. This
model allows us to describe user proﬁles by means of a PMF, leading to a sim-
ilar representation than that shown in Fig. 1a. Accordingly, we deﬁne q as the
probability distribution of the tags of a particular user and p as the distribution
of the population’s tags. In line with Sec. 3.3, we introduce a tag suppression
rate σ ∈ [0, 1), which is the ratio of suppressed tags to total tags. Thus, we
deﬁne the user’s apparent tag distribution s as q−r1−σ for some suppression policy
r = (r1, . . . , rn) satisfying 0  ri  qi and
∑
ri = σ for i = 1, . . . , n.
Inspired by the privacy criteria proposed in [18], we use an information-theo-
retic quantity to reﬂect the intuition that an attacker will be able to compromise
user privacy as long as the user’s apparent tag distribution diverges from the
population’s. Speciﬁcally, we consider the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [19],
which may be interpreted as a measure of discrepancy between probability dis-
tributions. Accordingly, we deﬁne privacy risk as the KL divergence between the
apparent distribution and the population’s, that is,
D(s ‖ p) = D
(
q − r
1− σ
∥
∥
∥
∥ p
)
.
Supposing that the population is large enough to neglect the impact of the choice
of r on p, we deﬁne now the privacy-tag suppression rate function
R(σ) = min
0riqi∑
ri=σ
D
(
q − r
1− σ
∥
∥
∥
∥ p
)
, (1)
which characterizes the optimal trade-oﬀ between privacy (risk) and tag suppre-
ssion rate, and formally expresses the intuitive reasoning behind tag suppression:
the higher the tag suppression rate σ, the lower the discrepancy in terms of the KL
divergence between the apparent distribution and the population’s, and the lower
the privacy risk. In addition, this formulation allows us to describe the functional
block suppressing tag generator in Sec. 3.3. Namely, this module will be responsi-
ble for solving the optimization problem in (1).
Our privacy criterion in the formulation of the privacy-tag suppression rate
function is justiﬁed, on the one hand, by the arguments in the literature advo-
cating entropy maximization [20], as our privacy measure may be regarded as
an extension of Shannon’s entropy [19], and on the other hand, by the rationale
behind divergence minimization and information gain minimization [18].
5 Concluding Remarks
There exists a large number of proposals for privacy preservation in the semantic
Web. Within these approaches, tag suppression arises as a simple technique in
terms of infrastructure requirements, as users need not trust an external entity.
However, this strategy comes at the cost of processing overhead and the semantic
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loss incurred by suppressing tags. Recall that we assumed that only a small num-
ber of users adhere to this privacy strategy, in contrast to the large population
of Internet users. In that case, the global detriment in semantic functionality is
small.
Our main contribution is an architecture that implements tag suppression in
the semantic Web. The proposed architecture helps users refrain from proposing
certain tags in order to hinder attackers in their eﬀorts to proﬁle users’ interests.
We describe the implementation details of our architecture. Speciﬁcally, the
core of the system is a module responsible for calculating a tag suppression
policy. The system uses this information to warn the user when their privacy is
being compromised and it is then for the user to decide whether to eliminate the
tag or not.
We present a mathematical formulation of the optimal trade-oﬀ between pri-
vacy and tag suppression rate in the semantic Web, which arises from the deﬁ-
nition of our privacy criterion.
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